Abstract: The UK copyright law regime presents the right to adapt as the sole, authoritative instrument in matters of legitimising translation; a legal "Big Other" conferring an otherwise unreal objective commodity status on what are instead always only ever individual and subjective acts of translation. Drawing primarily on the work of Theo Hermans, and the experiences of poet Jack Underwood in unsuccessfully attempting to formally translate poems by Mascha Kaléko, this article argues for (a) the development and (at the very least) implicit recognition of deviationist and subversive translative replies within -or at the very least alongside -the traditional UK legal schema and (b) a softening of the UK right to adapt by application of the integrity moral right to translations. In addition, a deeper quasi-Ungerian notion of institutional change that accommodates both principles (e. g. legitimate translations can, of course, be argued to exist, to which copyright accords) and counterprinciples (there are also, however, in the long term only multiple acts of translation, some preferred and commoditized, some existing outside that sphere, less functional and more creative/expressive but no less important and not to be prevented for those reasons) can also be advanced. Finally, a much broader critical point regarding the nature and role (or non-role) of law in the context of creative practices more generally can also be presented.
It has instead, he writes, "graduated to a version on a par with other versions (among them the original original), all of which are deemed to be equally authoritative, animated by the same authorial intent and therefore presumed to have the same meaning." 2 Hermans provides a number of examples of such institutionally imposed equivalence, two from religious history/myth, one, perhaps more usefully for the purposes of this paper, from law.
The first is the story of the ancient Septuagint, the translation by seventy Greek translators of the Hebrew Bible. All seventy worked independently yet produced identical reproductions. "God," Hermans writes, "had apparently breathed the one correct version into the translators' ears, hence the remarkable result." Hermans adds that "the story of the miracle evidently serves the purpose of investing the Greek rendition with a status equal to that of the Hebrew original […] God spoke with the same intent and with equal authority in both versions." 3 (But of course God did; for how could religious certainty -and more importantly moral authority -advance otherwise?).
4
Even more bizarre a tale of institutional equivalence is the story regarding the writing of the Book of Mormon. Joseph Smith, the story goes, having translated an unknown script from found golden plates, presented the plates and his translation to his associates -whereupon, "a voice descending from heaven declared that 'the book is true and the translation accurate'" and "the angel took the original plates under his wing and vanished with them, for good."
5 Once again, religious authority cements its claim to authenticity by endowing "the translation with a value equal to that of the original."
6
The third example provided by Hermans is of the UN Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an international treaty itself governing the construction of treaties. Here, the link between linguistic equivalence and legal authority (or, between law and an authoritative status in matters of translation) is perhaps made even clearer. Under the terms of the convention, treaties existing in parallel languages from the original cease to become translations "as soon as the multilingual treaty is agreed by the relevant parties as constituting one single legal instrument." 7 The parallel texts are then treated as equally authentic for the purposes of legal interpretation -in other words, for the purpose of having one (seemingly) authoritative vision.
2
Hermans uses these three examples to develop a general point: particular institutions -often, I would add, those that have a desire or vested interest in illustrating some central authority over certain matters, irrespective of whether or not any authority indeed exists -have no need of translations, per se (they have no need or real desire for multiple variations on a theme). Their aim is to simply point to a, for the most part, linguistically functional version. This functionality is also, given the context, presented as a proxy for authoritative equivalence. This advances the notion of law as a "Big Other,"
8 not so much concerned with vital, primarily proper ethical actions within creative pursuits (such as the possibility of a multiplicity of equivalently authoritative translations) 9 but simply with the business of existing as the object of authority.
The interest of law here is not so much substantive, therefore, but merely or at least primarily formalistic, concerned with illustrating that it does, in fact, maintain what legal theorist Roberto Unger critically referred to as an "immanent moral rationality." This is a rationality believed by those charged with 7 Hermans, "Translation," 58. 8 The "Big Other" being, to paraphrase Žižek, the agency for which one has to maintain the appearance of (x); See, further, Slavoj Žižek, Less Than Nothing: Hegel And The Shadow Of Dialectical Materialism (New York: Verso, 2013), 91. 9 Or, even, to widen somewhat the scope of interest, with multiplicity within creative endeavors generally; the Romantic notion of the singular and possessive "author" underlying most of what copyright law is all about, at least currently and at least, in a sense, for the individual artist involved. Artistic endeavors are not undertaken and shared, in this respect, but are "created" and "owned/controlled" (or even "disowned/controlled," and, regardless, only ever, again, at the bequest of the individual author). See, for example of this last point, the recent perspective of well-known US appropriation artist Richard Prince toward a work of his, a portrait of the daughter of US President Donald Trump: Prince has now -seemingly embarrassed of the previous connection with the Trump family -denied that the work is in fact a work of his, tweeting "This is not my work. I did not make it. I deny. I denounce. This fake art" and returning the $36,000 fee involved. Whether or not this position is an ironic pose is, as always with Prince, pretty difficult to discern. See, Jonathan Jones, "Richard Prince has disowned his Ivanka Trump work but he can't wash his hands so easily," (London) Guardian (January 16, 2017) Photography sect.
Translation, Copyright & Authority administering law to be, in some strange way, a foundational aspect of it, as if the materials of law (by virtue of being simply the current materiality of the idea of law itself) were themselves endowed with the attribute of right, considered choice in all matters and that outcome not being, instead, the (contingent) business and judgment of the people who administer it. 10 In this way, institutional action -and I include law and legal thinking here -has no concern with submitting to or accommodating the varying modes of thought or action common to the practice of translation itself. Rather, it is concerned with bringing the act of translation more so into line with an apparently solely authoritative vision supposedly inherent to the lawand, more worryingly, for that very simple fact.
3
Hermans writes: "One obvious consequence of authentication is that, having instituted equivalence, it does away with translation. And where there is no translation, there cannot be a translator." 11 In this instance, the translator is mortified; reduced to the status of a nonrole. Hermans draws three conclusions from this argument. First, translations cannot be equivalent to their originals -"they may pursue equivalence, as many translations do, but if they attain it they cease to be translations."
12 Actual success in a translation would equal in fact professional suicide -what need would there then be for concepts such as the original or, indeed, the translation? Second, "as long as translations fall short of their highest ambition and continue to function as translations, they cannot be definitive." 13 In other words, and thankfully so, as Hermans writes, "Translations are repeatable, they can be attempted again and again."
14
Finally, "because translations are repeatable, each has a translator's subject position written into it."
15 In undertaking translation, therefore, acceptance and recognition of subjectivity is important. All of this stands in direct opposition to This text is the result of a(n) (number of) varyingly authoritative interjection(s) -not only of the second translator, Ms Nussbaum, but also, particularly, a more implicit interjection by copyright law. This example of copyrights problematically authoritative role in translation helps to illustrate the blindness of the law as to matters where subjectivity is an important aspect of the practice -an advantage in some respects, of course, but not in all.
As Hermans reports, Nussbaum had made her own translation of parts of Anne Frank's diary for a publication, having been unhappy with the standard English translation of the diary by B.M. Mooyaart-Doubleday. 17 Nussbaum requested permission from the copyright holders, the Doubleday publishing company in New York, to print her preferred, alternative translation but was refused (the threat of injunctive action under copyright law being used as the preventative measure, of course). 18 Nussbaum nonetheless decided to reproduce the translation but inserted, as presented in the section quoted above as example, suggestions for improvement as a translation of her own, a kind of translative critique. The final product was as much a consequence of the subject position of Nussbaum in (re)interpreting Frank's words -and a reframing of that subjectivity around the imposing subliminal presence of the law itself -as it was of the supposedly objective validation offered by copyright law via legitimisation of a singular English text.
19
Hermans views this act of Nussbaum's as cleverly opening up "an intertextual dimension specific to the domain of translation." 20 Notably, it allows for the inscription of criticism of the previous translator into the texture of Nussbaum's version -a useful reminder, Hermans writes, of that fact that any particular rendition offers only "one of a number of possible ways of representing the original in translation."
21
Hermans also notes the role copyright law plays in this process. As he writes, copyright "can halt the dissemination of rival versions by granting one version the exclusive right to act as proxy, and therefore as the only permitted (not: the only possible!) replica of a given original."
22 Hermans conversely points out the time-limited nature of copyright, however, and argues that the return to the public domain after the 70-year post mortem auctoris term serves as a reminder that untranslatability, which he mentions previously, is "unstoppable in the longer term."
23
With this reference by Hermans to the role of copyright in restricting practice we thus see how objectivity, via the supposedly singularly authoritative voice of the law, does make a temporary stab at permanence; but equally how subjectivity as the cornerstone of a primarily creative and communicative practice wins right to adapt than the main and more radical one suggested in this article: present the translation as a form of fair dealing for the purposes of criticism or review (or even, potentially as a quotation) under the exceptions to copyright that exist already in UK law (See the Copyright Designs & Patents Act, 1988) (It has additionally been suggested to me that other national copyright exception regimes e. g. the US Fair Use regime, could offer more in terms of flexibility for the type of translative actions at issue in this paper. I agree. But it is precisely the inflexibility of the UK approach I would like to address; hence the focus on UK law). While these exceptions in themselves are perhaps other admirable forms of deviationist doctrine, they do not, however, position the counterprinciples of repeatable translation, non-equivalency and subjectivity as equal to the principles of the right to adapt. They therefore fall more so under the heading of critique (or quotation) generally (which, as practices, would arguably have to have critique or quotation as their core feature, rather than as something ancillary to them in order to succeed as exceptional acts) rather than under another (equally) more general and positive heading of being simply a translative reply, as will be proposed herein. The importance of having this separate category is that not all alternatives will be critiques or quotations even capable of falling under those headings; it is therefore more sensible to have a broad separate category under which such general translative possibilities can fall. But we are perhaps getting ahead of ourselves here. 20 Hermans, "Translation," 60. 21 Hermans, "Translation," 61. 22 Hermans, "Translation," 61. 23 Hermans, "Translation," 61; important to note that untranslatability is meant here as the impossibility of definitive translations.
out -indeed should win out, or at the very least should be more properly accommodated -over time.
A general contention in this paper, however, is that (a) copyright re: translations is perhaps even more insidious and repressive than Hermans critique already implicitly suggests and (b) utilising the Ungerian notion of deviationist doctrine, 24 one should not have to wait for the term of copyright to end before the complex nature of translation is accommodated in law; that indeed it can and should be accommodated concurrent with the run of the conventional copyright term.
25
Building, therefore, on the act undertaken by Nussbaum, the conceptual assistance offered by Hermans in understanding the practice of translation, the doctrinal work of Roberto Unger and, as will be seen, the experiences of UK poet Jack Underwood in circumventing the constraints of copyright to engage with translative acts, it is hoped that a new perspective on what law can offer translation -if, indeed, we accept that it should offer anything and that 24 In essence deviationist -or expanded -doctrine has as its central feature the attempt "to cross both an empirical and a normative frontier: the boundaries that separate doctrine from empirical social theory and from argument over the proper organization of society -that is, from ideological conflict;" Roberto Unger, Critical Legal Studies Movement (London, New York: Verso, 2015), 577. In the context of this paper, as will be illustrated in more detail later, this means more practically the attempt to address ideological issues concerning the essential features of the practice of translation (and its ethical space) within the confines of established legal doctrine related to the practice. 25 Admittedly, the entire (dominant) justificationary basis of copyright law is that what is occurring with the grant of a copyright is a bargain between parties -the copyright owner gets a temporary and ultimately conceptual exclusionary zone placed around their work for a limited period, upheld by force of law (or, indeed, force of arms); society -or the state hoping to quell unrest within society -benefits from the production of the type of works with which copyright concerns itself. This bargain is thought to be the best response to the problem of motivating society to create "goods" that are public (public implying that, generally speaking, they are non-rivalrous and non-excludable). But this is only one way to view the problem of creation motivation for public goods; cultural works -indeed any kind of abstract work -can and will be produced for a vast number of reasons, many of which have nothing to do with the promise of immediate reward and many of which in fact embrace the largely non-rival and nonexcludable nature of creative works (which is, in any event, somewhat practically inaccurate as a true description of their nature). And more importantly, while viewing copyright law as a bargain can be seen as allowing repeatable translation in the long term, as Keynes put it, "in the long run we are all dead" (John Maynard Keynes, A Tract on Monetary Reform, (London: Macmillan and Co., 1924), 80). Why not act now? Reform in law can be developed so as to address difficulties that happen right now, resultant from practices undertaken by copyright owners via the permissions granted by the law.
Translation, Copyright & Authority transaction not be configured, instead, the other way around 26 -can therefore be presented.
5
I had been thinking of Hermans perspectives on equivalence, institutions, copyright and translation while reading of the experiences poet Jack Underwood had in attempting to "legitimately" translate some of the poems of poet Mascha Kaléko.
27
I believe I first became aware of Underwood's issue as a result of a post by him on social media platform Twitter. Reading through his linked blog post 28 about the difficulties he experienced in gaining a formal permission by the Kaléko estate to undertake translation, 29 I became curious about how the existence and application of copyright (a) restricted his practice and (b), as a result of being seen as "being responsible for" an authenticated version in any eventas a result of seeing itself as instrumental in some "legitimization" processactually encouraged his work of translation to move into a new, previously unplanned direction, arguably taking it beyond translation itself (but still, I would also argue, being very much rooted in the traditions of that practice). In essence, somewhat similar to (though not exactly the same as, of course) the aforementioned actions of Nussbaum in response to the preventative measures taken by the copyright holder re: the Frank diaries.
26 A point which will be addressed at the end of this article. Perhaps, I thought, an argument can be made on the basis of Underwood's interpretation of the end result of his somewhat translative interjection (and, indeed, on the basis of Nussbaum's somewhat similar act) for recognition within copyright law of a new mode of translative action, one that circumvents the ideology of copyright (via the right to adapt) as the supposedly singularly authoritative voice -this "Big Other" of linguistic equivalence -and which thus illustrates a more critical engagement with the game of law (and translation) than mere acquiescence to its somewhat oppressive and restrictive terms.
6
As noted above Underwood has himself posted an explanation of what happened on his blog: how he had been working on a series of translations of Kaléko poems; how the Kaléko estate had said, categorically, "'NO WAY' to the idea of publishing them, 'in any form, anywhere';" 30 how, having worked on them for quite some time, this was, understandably, very disappointing news. On his blog Underwood explains how the main concern of the estate was "the fact that I do not speak German," and, also, "the fact that I had made it very clear that I was quite happy adding new stanzas or completely removing others in pursuit of a good English language version."
31 They stopped the process, without, he adds, "reading any of my efforts."
32
Considering an "authentic and permitted" translation therefore no longer an option, Underwood decided to "regroup;" he was still interested in the work but "aware translation was no longer an option."
33
His new strategy was, instead, a series of replies, love letters to the love poems of Kaléko -or "classic poetic homage" as Underwood writes. 34 This lack of knowledge about legal options -or simple disinterest in pursuing other possible legal avenues -illustrates however not entrenchment or retreat as some might argue but instead a vital way of interacting with the law on creative matters in any event: do not kotow but instead re-route and circumvent the desire for an apparent objectivity (that law would have you accept) completely. The fundamental role of the artist in the face of a seemingly objective law is in fact this very process, I would argue: re-routing constantly around attempts at 30 Underwood, "Solos." 31 Underwood, "Solos." 32 Underwood, "Solos." 33 Underwood, "Solos." 34 Underwood, "Solos."
Translation, Copyright & Authority objectivity -because the objectivity is not really real, in any event (we simply choose for the purpose of ease to believe in its realness) -and reaffirming a vital yet sympathetic subjectivity. This constant re-routing is, I would add, inherently important to the process of translation (and, of course, to other creative processes that are occasionally restricted by legal activity). In Underwood's case his circumvention led, therefore, to "translative replies" instead of more traditional, legitimately authorised translations.
Underwood points out that he happily settled on the terminology of replies both "legally and creatively," but adds that they are "not translations, not versions, not even, I don't think, pastiches." 35 However, given that he also
later adds that what's weird is that I've written these replies in a voice/style I sort of developed during the course of translating her, so these are brand new poems in something like her style as I might have rendered it had I not been forbidden to, on the grounds my rendering could not possible approximate her style accurately.
36
I would conceptualise these less as sole replies and more as translative replies, replies that have the translative act as their foundation. I wrote to Underwood with questions in order to get some more information about the process he employed and also to get a sense of his thinking about copyright and how it interferes/interacts with literary translation, specifically his attempts to obtain permission from the Kaléko estate.
37
I provide the questions and answers here below in unedited form, with some commentary underneath each response, as appropriate. As you shall see from my comments, contained within Underwood's responses are the seeds of suggestions developed in this paper regarding a potentially new mode of engaging with translation within the existing framework imposed by UK copyright law.
7
Q.1 -How early did you begin the process of contacting the estate -prior to writing the original translations or after you had finished them? Did you think copyright would be such a bar to translation prior to contacting them?
35 Underwood, "Solos." 36 Underwood, "Solos." 37 Underwood was first contacted in 2014.
I wrote around five translations and after that felt they were going well enough to approach the estate/publisher by email. I did that probably about two or three weeks after starting the initial translations. I had to wait another fortnight or so, during which time I probably produced another four or so further translations. I think I had nine or ten finished drafts by the time I was told my request had been unsuccessful. I was probably quite naive about my prospects of attaining permission. I thought that as Kaleko was pretty unknown here they'd appreciate a young poet's interest. Perhaps that's arrogant, too. I also thought they'd be on board for 'versions' or 'free-translations' as there is a massive precedent to this, not least with the retelling of classical texts etc. [Author's bold]. I think the absence of a widely known Kaleko volume in English actually stood against my chances, since a definitive, literal version seemed to be more what they were after.
Again, here we see the implicit need for, as Underwood terms it, "definitive" and "literal" versions; versions that can be easily and successfully commoditised as "one and true" and which thus require the authoritative and apparent moral support of copyright, the supposedly conventional voice of reason in matters of legitimising translation for the literary marketplace. All other versions may not be easily commoditised -or may impose a further subjectivity, an ambiguity, that might confuse the market place, and which therefore should not be permitted. Note also, however, that Underwood refers to "versions" or "free translations" as being known in the translation community as a somewhat accepted practice. This illustrates the existence of what we can term (and now clarify properly as) important Ungerian counterprinciples within translation practice norms 38 ; the ones referenced previously by Hermans as "repeatable translatability," "non-equivalency" and "subjectivity." These counterprinciples should 38 Unger's conceptualisation of principles and counterprinciples will be discussed in more depth later but perhaps a preliminary reference here to Unger's conceptualisation of the two within contract law might assist in a better understanding of them at this point. For example, Unger writes: the generalization of contract theory revealed, alongside the dominant principles of freedom to choose the partner and the terms, the counterprinciples: that freedom to contract would not be allowed to undermine the communal aspects of social life and that grossly unfair bargains would not be enforced. Though the counterprincples might be pressed to the corner, they could be neither driven out completely nor subjected to some system of metaprinciples that would settle, once and for all, their relation to the dominant principles.
Unger, Critical Legal Studies Movement, 569. Suffice to say at this stage, therefore, that the principle that appears to underlie the applicability of copyright re: translation is that of there being only one, singularly authoritative translation of any work. In this sense the counterprinciples (equally important, as Unger would have it) are the notion that translation is in fact repeatable and no one version has a fundamental claim to authority (being fundamentally nonequivalent and subjective), but that there may of course be (a) more preferred version(s).
Translation, Copyright & Authority balance out the more dominant principle evident in copyright law, that of the possibility of a solely authoritative version, the one "true and accurate" versionbut somehow through either ignorance, laziness or deliberate obfuscation they are not allowed to. This notion, however, of doctrinally embodying in copyright law both the counterprinciples and principles that exist within translation norms is a cornerstone of my proposal for change.
Q.2 -What was your general level of knowledge about copyright prior to this experience?
Pretty basic, but I knew that you needed permission from an estate or author before publishing something called a 'translation', something essentially purporting to be 'their' work. I was also aware of translation as a growing field and discipline academically, and how ideas of authorship had been debated in light of poststructualism etc. I also knew that as far as the publishing industry was concerned, and ownership of texts was concerned, things were still pretty conservative and more concerned with protecting a legacy, rather than encouraging new artistic engagement [Author's bold].
Here we see how copyright succeeds in advancing a notion of itself as the moral imprimatur in matters of translation, especially within the literary marketplace and amongst writers. The generally understood need for "permission", derived from the copyright grant, inhibits any chance of initial positive and speculative action. The powerful, experienced and vital subjectivity of the translator is already restricted from the outset using only the instrument of the "conservative" and repressive reputation of the law, the tool of an apparent objectivity; an inhibitor of, as Underwood puts it, "new artistic engagement." Of course, one can make the distinction here between the form of a piece and its content and argue that copyright law ensures that a translation respects the nature of the content as the work of the original author while permitting for a different form qua translation. But every translation -in distorting the form -distorts the content and in turns becomes the work of the translator as much as that of the original author. In addition, all this misses the central point -that it is the power held by the copyright owner that presents (or allows the owner to present) a definitive version in the sense of both form and content, a state of affairs the act of translation by definition contradicts.
Q.3 -How did you feel once you realised you would have to take a different direction -and do you feel the copyright owner was justified in restricting your translation?
I was disappointed, because I felt I had gained a lot from the process and done a decent job. I liked the conversation between Kaleko's voice as it seemed to come through the poems via the translation software and English versions I could find, and my own voice. I felt that translating her poems had taken me outside of my usual range, as it were, and allowed for a more archaic, overtly romantic tone, which I found very freeing. At the same time I felt I was bringing a more contemporary tone and style to the work which teased out nice things about the originals: the irony and deadpan in Kaleko's writing. The most common complaint I find about Kaleko's work in English is that it sounds too cute, or dainty, when I could tell through the images she was using and the tone that was coming through that the poems were a bit drier than that, more sort of empowered.
Underwood reflects here on the practice of translation itself, aptly illustrating the contrast between copyright's self-appointed role -acting as an authority, suggesting an authoritative, objective and ultimately final equivalence, even if only temporarily -and the proper role of translation and the translator, this blending of subjectivities. Underwood's perspective has more in common with the arguments put forward by Hermans, whereby translation requires subjective positioning, is repeatable and never attains any real equivalence. These counterprinciples underlying the practice of translation -these ideas about what translation can also be, apart from being only the principled attempt at singularly authoritative versions -require, I believe, urgent accommodation in the law.
Q.4 -Who was the copyright owner in this instance -the publisher, the estate?
I believe it was the estate, though I think they were in discussion with the publisher and taking advice. I was told the estate had been consulted, and that the publisher and estate were in agreement.
The need to consult with the estate -using the publisher as conduit -indicates the weight the copyright holder has in determining matters of authorisation. I would be interested to discover who made the judgment regarding the reasons why Underwood's request was denied i. e. lack of German ability, questioning his intention to remove stanzas with a view to getting a good English version. Why should these issues prevent an attempt at translation, if we accept the importance of subjective positioning in translation? If it was indeed the copyright holder and not the publisher it illustrates not only the need for a liberalism regarding a certain type of translative action alongside attempts at authoritative versions (the main argument of the paper) but also how necessary the inclusion of a real form of creative arbitrage into -or alongside -the more economic right to adapt is in any event.
This is especially so, since under UK copyright law (and as will be discussed in more depth later) there is no right to object to a derogatory treatment of an original literary work via translation. This is something that could, however, be relied upon as a form of creative arbitrage outside the protection offered by purely economic rights if things went somehow "wrong" creatively and which could therefore be ultimately persuasive in actually encouraging the permit of translations more generally -if only it existed.
In the situation involving Underwood, for example, if such a right to object did apply to translation, the estate may have permitted translation in the first instance, figuring that a right to object on derogatory grounds could be applied later in any event. Its non-existence however, as will be argued later, can only be a consequence of the dominance of the view that there are in fact only singularly authoritative translations. This is further evidence of the more fundamental need for recognition within copyright law of a new mode of translative action -what Underwood terms the "translative reply." Crucially, however, and alongside the acceptance of that translative act, it also highlights the need for reform of existing law in addition to this suggestion, so that, for example, there is a right to object to derogatory treatment of an original literary work via translation.
Provisionally, therefore, we can at this stage interrupt our reading of Underwood's replies and suggest in outline what our reforms might be more practically. First, that (a) the right to adapt remain as is, with the important addition, however, of the application of authorised translations to the ambit of the moral right to object to derogatory treatment. This will encourage copyright owners to accommodate, I believe, many more translation requests, as they then have an additional mechanism for objecting to them if they do not meet the creative standards involved. It also allows them the luxury of presenting an authenticated version, the official translation; important, one perhaps has to accept, for commodification and marketability within the literary field.
Alongside this, however, more radical reform would additionally require that (b) the creation of translative replies should be permitted as an exceptional act, an act which does not require the permission of the copyright holder. Such translative replies would in turn, however, not be subject to the right to object to derogatory treatment employed by the author of the work to which one replies (and the author of a reply could not, in turn, uphold that right over the reply(s) that they create). Such translative replies would also be regulated by the proviso that they cannot market themselves as translations per se; they in fact must explicitly state that they are only a translative reply and not any type of more authorised version.
Q.5 -Do -did -you have a publication plan for the translated works (now replies)?
I was just planning on sending them to a few magazines initially, though as soon as I began reworking things, and thinking about replies, I began talking to an independent publisher about a pamphlet for the series. That still looks good though things have slowed down a little for various reasons. I intend to publish them next year some time?
To date the replies have not been published. 39 It may well be that the difficulty inherent in dealing with the controllers of the estate sucked some momentum out of the project -which illustrates even more the damaging impact this notion of there being only a singularly authoritative version permissible within the copyright regime can have on creative practice. If the translative reply was recognised within copyright law -as a new category within the excepted acts, for example -perhaps the work would now be in the public eye, or at least things would move more quickly. Surely this could only benefit both Underwood and the estate (in terms of increasing awareness of the work of the author)?
Q.6 -What is your take on the finished poems in relation to your original intention and how much or little did the process of negotiation with the estate, dealing with copyright etc. feed into the process, if it all?
The responses/replies are in what I have come to see as my 'Mascha Voice' which I developed through the initial translation process, so even though they are not translations and are very much their own, separate poems, I wouldn't have hit on this sort of style of voice without the initial attempts at translation. By replying to these source texts I feel somehow I am able to get away with certain moves I would consider more to do with how Kaleko writes than I do, necessarily, though it's hard to say. I'm purely going on what I kind of imagine her work to sound like. I think there can be a kind of accuracy of feeling as much as an accuracy of terms, and since I can't use any of her terms I'm just dealing with the weird mood, atmosphere, associative field left over from the experience of reading the work and trying to phrase it in English. I suppose my 'take' on the relation would be that what I have is a very vague sort of trace of something that feels extraneous to my usual way of working, phrasing, thinking, but that I know is probably all just me. I don't have a problem with that. I think it's interesting, in a way, and says something about the participatory nature of reading, especially reading poetry which is deliberately about inciting connotative, associative dialogue with a text, is deliberately a discourse, in that sense. I've really no idea how far my dealings with the estate has fed into anything, beyond the fact that being 'forbidden' the kind of access to Kaleko's work sort of adds this weird romantic 'star-crossed lovers' narrative dimension to my replies to her love poems, which is playful, but perhaps a little barbed maybe, yes, because I wanted a much closer relationship with her poems initially.
Underwood highlights here the fact that copyright generates a forbidden quality around works, that idea of the work being something that translators are denied/permitted access to; this stems, of course, from this notion of the possibility of there being only authoritative versions. Circumventing this forbidden status allows Underwood to re-assert his subjectivity in the translative act (the circumventory act thus addressing the broader question: how can translation of anything be forbidden?) but it strikes me that a better response (and one that relies less on the rare chance of the translator having the individual imagination and chutzpah to act in opposition of the law) is, as stated, recognition of the possibility of less explicitly authorised versions in copyright law as an exceptional act. This would resolve the potential for this difficulty re: the notion of the forbidden text, and encourage translators to act -the threat of oppressive legal action being undertaken by the copyright owner somewhat diminished.
Q. 7 -Are you happy with the outcome, given the copyright issues?
Yeah, sure. The estate want a different kind of translation to the one I was offering, so it's fine. I totally understand and respect their position on that, and their sense of duty towards protecting a poet's legacy.
Quite a reasonable response here, but perhaps only possible as Underwood was himself happy with the results of his decision to form translative replies. Without that outcome -and especially given that he had completed a lot of work prior to finding out that the copyright holder would not permit -his attitude may have been quite the opposite. It thus seems fundamentally churlish to prevent these creative acts, especially when, as has been outlined, with a simply categorisation technique, some reform of the conventional right to adapt and some explicit/implicit recognition by the law, their distinction from more conventional translations could be easily established.
Q.8 -How would you negotiate a process where you are the copyright owner of a poem and a foreign language poet wished to translate your poetry, given what you went through in this situation?
I've been translated into lots of languages, including Malayalam and Russian, which I can't even get a basic latinate handle on. I trust the translator and since most of the time they are after something like a literal accuracy first and foremost I trust them to go on their nerves with that. If a translator wanted to do something more radical, like cut stanzas, add lines, or was using online software as a basis of the translation I would only ask that something of the process was made clear should the translations make it to print. It doesn't seem like rocket surgery to me to have 'these are free-translations, translated intralingually from new source texts produced using online translation software' or something written as a footnote or at the beginning or end of a sequence. It doesn't matter if someone reading that doesn't know what it means, they would just recognise that something other than literality and stylistic 'accuracy' is being prioritised. Personally I'd love that. I'd love a poet to explore and mutate my work in that way. I'd find that sort of 'getting inside' and expanding new corners of a poem a thrilling idea. I imagine my publisher, or family would probably be more tentative. This is quite interesting as here we see again the possibility of categorising (broadly) certain translations as something akin to translative replies, acts which as Underwood indicates could be distinguished from the more conventional accurate and authorised version. Drawing on Underwood's perspective there may well be strong desire for such a creative and legal category as proposed here amongst the writing and translation communities.
Q.9 -What was your attitude towards copyright and how do you feel about it now?
On the one hand I can see that in a culture dominated by absolute capital value a certain literalism or conservative view of intellectual property is going to dictate the way we legislate ideas of ownership, in what is in fact a much messier, intertextual heap of a situation. This is because in fields other than poetry there is usually financial reward for an idea, like Coca-Cola. At the same time this notion of financial reward seems generally misplaced in poetry, which our culture generally doesn't feel it should pay for, and when it does, by the way of awards, poets themselves often feel icky about the limiting ideas of 'quality' which dictate how those rewards are distributed, so with poems I guess we're really talking less about rewards and more about intellectual property; copyright is important to the inherently hobbyist, unrewarded poet, because the work is drawn from their feelings, their hard work and original way of thinking. And yet, most poets will recognise the feeling of reading someone else's work and thinking 'hang on, this is my fucking idea!' It happened to me yesterday, in fact. I read this poem out to my girlfriend and she was like 'she's totally ripped you off.' The thing is, that can happen in a situation when totally different terms are being used. It can be the same tone, same idea, same feeling, but totally different words. Factor into that paradoxical aspect of language the further complication of intent (did they knowingly rip you off?) and you're essentially trying to claim authorship over a kind of unconscious activity in the mind of another person, an unconscious activity over which you, yourself, have very little control when writing. Can you claim ownership over the idea of an apple being like a heart? Seriously? It doesn't work! Copyright generally works on the reductionist assumption that certain exact 'terms' or 'signs' produce 'meaning' and that if you can protect exact terms or signs then everyone's intellectual property is safe. With poetry, at least, no one is going to be able to afford, or have the audacity to take anyone to court over the fact an image or idea 'feels similar' but they might over an obvious plagiarism of terms. With translation across languages, where the terms are necessarily differing (cow/vache, dog/chien etc.) I guess things get trickier still.
I don't know how I feel about copyright, basically, because it seems like an imposition of certain characteristics on language that language itself doesn't have, while also, with Translation, Copyright & Authority poems, being the imposition of a system via which capital value can be assured on an artform which itself sets out to question and overthrow such notions of absolute value. I think it makes practical sense to protect exact terms, yes, of course. And changing a few words, as with the Mort/Ward case, for instance, is obviously still an act of plagiarism. As for intellectual property, I have to suck it in when I think someone has ripped off a poem of mine, or I have to take it as a compliment, or I have to assume they haven't even read my poem or whatever, and other poets who feel I've ripped them off will have to suck it in too for the same reasons. The moral side of it is to do with intention, isn't it -I wasn't intending to write 'accurate' literal versions of Kaleko, and since that is what the estate wanted, I didn't get the nod, so it would be morally wrong to publish them anyway, regardless of the fact an indie pamphlet isn't going to = $$$$$$££££££ So an imperfect, philosophically problematic thing, copyright, but probably necessary. Sorry, long answer.
As to this last response, I do not think much more needs -or perhaps even canbe added.
8
Arguably, then, the ethical mode of approach to all matters on translation should be developed primarily from those who work within the field itselffrom those who are doing the work themselves -not simply those who understand only how law works.
But how does the current law work in this scenario, of one wanting to legally translate the work of another; and if it does not work to accommodate counterprinciples foundational to the practice of translation (likely, given how, as Unger would argue, counterprinciples are inherently oppositional, keeping "principles in place and preventing them from extending, imperialistically, to all social life" 40 ) how might it be changed to do so? Or, perhaps, our understanding of the current law on translation is unfair; perhaps it does indeed accommodate both principles (recognition of an authoritative version) and counterprinciples (e. g. equal recognition of repeatable translations undeterred by the existence of a sole imprimatur) and no change is needed at all?
Under UK copyright law -the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) 1988 (as amended) -it is an infringement of copyright to make an adaptation of a literary, dramatic or musical work; adaptation includes "a translation of the work." In this way, copyright law grants to the author of a literary work 42 the right to authorise or prevent any subsequent translations of that work. The variety of reasons as to why an author will either authorise or prevent a translation are too numerous to mention here, but a reasonable argument can be made along the lines of the author usually only authorising translation when, in their eyes, it concurs considerably with the "original" work, and/or, in addition, does not diminish whatever positive effects, economic or otherwise, are felt to emanate from the original. In this way, the right to adapt -as a legal instrument of copyright lawmust be felt to contain (doctrinally) some immanently authoritative value. In certain matters of translation, it acts as the imprimatur, giving the literary work a (for the most part) "legitimized" social existence in the language of the translation. Copyright allows for a translation that, in this sense, is felt -or simply seen -to "count."
Any permitted acts of translation are thus interesting anomalies in UK copyright law, if we accept that no translation equates to a fully authoritative equivalence in linguistic terms (if we accept that fully authoritative equivalence is, in fact, impossible, in line with Hermans argument); they are statutorily permitted transformative works. Transformation is not really permitted, however, because the commodity as literary work in fact requires translation; without the variance from the "original," there is no additional commodity ready for other linguistic markets. A certain variance is only to be expected, therefore. Accepting this notion of translations as in fact transformative works within law is deceptive, therefore, especially in terms of accommodating truly transformative work, where creative expression is built upon a work; translation is defined by transformation.
And in this way, therefore, any permission of the author to allow adaptation of the work presupposes there has been some degree of agreement, either implicit or explicit, as to variation; that the translation will, in this sense, fit authorial requirements regarding having a translation in the target language (though not always, of course). Or, conversely, the author, via permission, simply accepts that the process of translation will in some way transform the work in any event; accepts that it is useful for their career, reputation and perhaps income that there are translations in the world and is therefore not unduly concerned as to the nature of the transformations required for these 42 The "literary work" category is a broad church but of course includes those forms most usually subject to translation e. g. novels, plays, book of non-fiction, poetry.
Translation, Copyright & Authority translations to exist. What the translator does in order to translate the text for the foreign book market is, in this sense, up to them.
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Of course all of the above assumes the author still has control over the copyright, but this may not be the case -often within a commercial publishing contract scenario the author will sign over the copyrights needed for the purpose of translation and the publisher subsequently deals with negotiating rights on their behalf. As is the case with Kaléko, the author may be dead and copyrights will be administered by a literary estate (or they could, perhaps, be the focus of a trust).
In this case -and assuming no conditions have been attached by the author regarding post mortem management of their work -the decision as to permission and any associated quality control is entirely within the hands of the publisher or whoever subsequently owns the copyright (the publisher may well sell on these copyrights to third parties). Whether or not the publisher/ copyright owner wants to micro-manage creative translation standards beyond simply having a text for sale in the target language is then a private matter, as a matter of copyright.
It is reasonable to assume that the majority of commercial publishers will be more concerned with simply having a functional text that can be read and sold amongst speakers of the target language. This is certainly the case with, let us say, more functional texts. In certain sections of the literary world, howeverthose, for example, of literary fiction, poetry or experimental fiction -one would 43 Where the author of the original work does not even understand the language of the translation, this inherent acceptance of transformation will be, of course, much stronger -for here the author will have limited means by which to disagree with the nature of the translation. Problems will naturally occur when the author of the original piece has knowledge of the secondary language. In Ian Thompson, The Ethics of Primo Levi, (London) The Times Literary Supplement, (June 15, 2016) , Thompson writes how Levi exercised control over the German translation of If This is A Man, commenting:
Where Levi had written, "he had finished", Reidt substituted, "he had ceased to exist." Levi vigorously objected. "When I wrote 'he had finished' I was referring to Sómogyi's slow, terrible death-struggle," explaining: "Ever obedient, here was a man who would only allow himself to die once he had 'had finished' saying Jawohl." Such scrupulousness was understandable in a man who was about to be published in the country that had sought to annihilate him and his co-religionists; Levi had to be sure that his translated work said to the Germans exactly what he intended.
But frustration was also possible where Levi had less aptitude in the target language; Thompson writes how Levi attempted (but failed) to have Spanish and French editions recalled from circulation due to what he -and perhaps more importantly others -felt were serious weaknesses.
possibly expect a degree of concern on this matter. Indeed, often translators become famous in their own right, as well as respected translators of the author's work or works in a particular language (see, for example, the translations of Italian literary works into to English by the translator William Weaver). But, ultimately, it will be a matter for the publisher/owner to decide given they have the ability to authorise adaptations.
In this respect, copyright law (specifically the right to adapt) currently embodies only the principle in the "scheme of possible and desirable human interaction" 44 regarding translation. That principle is that, in matters of translation, one singularly authoritative translation can exist and also that, given how the original personifies or embodies the personality of the author, multiple translations should therefore be prevented as infringements of the right to adapt. 45 Admittedly, the owner of the copyright can make any right to adapt non-exclusive, maintaining the right to permit multiple translations in the target language at any one time. This is rarely exercised, however; probably because higher fees can be charged for exclusive rights to adapt. The counterprinciples underlying the practice of translation are not, therefore, particularly evident in the law regulating translation. This is perhaps to be expected; as Unger writes,
Once the crucial role of counterprinciples has been recognized, the appeal to a larger vision of the possible and desirable models of human connection becomes inevitable. Because conventional analysis wants to avoid, if not the reality, at least the appearance of such an appeal, it also systematically downplays the counterpriciples.
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In other words, it suits the literary marketplace to downplay the appeal of repeatable translatability, non-equivalence and subjectivity.
Having looked at the right to adapt, therefore, one can easily state that the law in the UK is not particularly accommodating of the radical potential of the translative act, as identified by the theories, words and acts of (in no particular order of importance) Hermans, Nussbaum and Underwood.
Outside the realm of copyright per se, however (and in particular the right to adapt), there also exists the important issue of moral rights in literary works. 47 In this way the perspective of the author is still potentially capable of being protected even if the more overt economic right to adapt has been, for example, signed away (while moral rights cannot be transferred to third parties they can Translation, Copyright & Authority also be waived, of course -or the acts covered by them consented to -though these practices are less common.) 48 In particular, the existence of the moral right to object to derogatory treatment (also sometimes referred to as the "right to integrity") complicates matters, because here the issue is less to do with mere commodificationanodizing the work for the market place, for simple linguistic equivalence or for both -and more so with satisfying/reconciling the creative or aesthetic standards of the creator of the work and, indeed, (one would imagine in the often collaborative process of translation) the translator. This issue has already been briefly referred to but let us now look at it in more detail: what is the state of affairs regarding the right to integrity and translations in the UK?
Under the CDPA 1988, the "author of a copyright literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work, and the director of a copyright film" does have the right "in the circumstances mentioned in this section not to have his work subjected to derogatory treatment." 49 The right to object to derogatory treatment arises when the work in question has been published or otherwise put before the public. Treatment, however, is defined as any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaptation of the work, other than a translation of a literary or dramatic work or an arrangement or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of key or register. Treatment of a work is considered to be derogatory if "it amounts to distortion or mutilation of the work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director."
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Under UK copyright law, therefore, no translation can be even argued to be a derogatory treatment, potentially prejudicial to the honor or reputation of the author of the original -an argument that, it should be noted, can be made by right for the vast array of other works that fall under the heading "literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work," and especially, in the context of literary or dramatic works, when translation has not been attempted. And yet, as noted by One can, of course, make a reasonable argument for not allowing translations to be subject to the derogatory treatment moral right; that translation by its very nature involves a considerable degree of free transformation and that by enveloping translations into the ambit of the derogatory treatment right the practice of translation would be unnecessarily complicated and perhaps even compromised. The translator must feel that they have a certain degree of freedom. Also, arguably -and problematically, for the purposes of the arguments for change we present here -having a right to object to a derogatory treatment qua translation implies an objectivity over a work -and within the practice of translation -that we have so far been mainly arguing against. But crucially, I would argue, it is not the notion of any semblance of objectivity in creative practice that is the problem, but rather its doctrinal dominance as a principle unbalanced by the non-existence of counterprinciples evident within the law. I am not therefore suggesting in this paper that the notion of an "authorized" version be done away with completely, or even suggesting that a somewhat objective quality cannot be aimed at or expected in engaging in translation; rather that it be supplemented by law that reflects also the counterprinciples within the practice of translation. Accepting the possibility of an authorised version alongside non-authorised translative replies, however, necessitates the application of the integrity right to translations. The right will soften the exclusivity of the right to adapt, hopefully encouraging more permissions because an additional preventative measure is available ex post. And if none of that helps, then the translator can turn to the non-authorised translative reply as an exceptional act.
The state of affairs for acts of translation, therefore, under UK copyright law, is that literary works may of course be adapted (translated), provided the copyright holder permits; but that no moral right to object to a derogatory treatment qua translation exists. Any translation, no matter how odious, cannot be a derogatory treatment. Exceptional acts specific to translation do not exist. , 3rd edition,  2000) , 593, who, referring to the 1987 French case of Zorine (Leonide) v Le Lucernaire, (in which an author successfully prevented the public performance of his play in a translation and in a production which seriously distorted the original meaning), wrote, "The exclusion of translations from the definition should be confined to true and accurate translations [Author's underlining] , as it is difficult to see why an author should not be able to object to a translation which murders his work or distorts its meaning."
Translation, Copyright & Authority
This reinforces our initial point regarding the dominance of only the principle underlying translation within UK copyright law over translations: translations that are authorised for the purpose of copyright are assumed to be in this sense completely authoritative; they are assumed to be the "true and accurate translation" (which by definition cannot be derogatory), even though, in most instances, they are merely simply the authorised. An equivalence between the authorised and the accurately/properly translated is assumed by the doctrinal instrument of the right to adapt under UK copyright law -by the very existence and application of the right.
This exceptional status for translations does seem problematic, however, especially since one could argue that other analogous creative works get protection from potentially derogatory transformative adaptations that may not necessarily be copyright infringement but may well be considered to be a derogatory treatment. In addition, it seems even more odious given the actual and recognised existence of repeatable translations within the translation community.
Thus, in a sense, all of Underwood's difficulty in engaging legally with the poems. The estate holds the UK rights regarding adaptation; Underwood requests permission, and they deny, citing his lack of German aptitude and his intention to change or remove stanzas (and, arguably, because if they permitted in any event they would have no way of regulating quality ex post). In this respect, making an editorial judgment in advance as that is all they have the right to do.
If they had authorised Underwood to attempt a translation, however, and had been unhappy with it in any event, under UK law they could not have objected to it. In a sense, one can therefore understand the reluctance this creates for author's/estate's/publishers to be somewhat generous with granting permissions. They have no remedy in the law for when they believe a translation goes wrong creatively. Does this mean that they then become more hesitant generally with granting permission for translation under copyright, since it is their only weapon? It would explain the additional skill requirements and editorial comments made by the Kaléko estate in denying the simple right to adapt. Perhaps, conversely, estates/authors/publishers would be more open to translations occurring if they also had the option of objecting ex post to any creative issues, via an integrity right?
It does seem unreasonable, on the part of UK copyright law, to forcefully equate the simply authorised translation with a notional "true and accurate translation," one which cannot be derogatory (it seems unreasonable to allow a copyright over translations but disallow any moral right to object to it as a derogatory treatment of the original, especially when a visual artist would have both rights).
Underwood, for example, suffered in not being authorised because the copyright prevents unauthorised translations; but equally, it seems only fair to indeed allow authors to object to derogatory treatment that might be the consequence of engaging in the act of translation, as a separate right. Why? Because if one can authorise adaptation, the authorisation should not implicitly assume an integrity in the translation.
The point is a subtle one, I grant you -especially when under UK law the copyright over translations effectively operates as the moral right to object to derogatory treatment by stealth i. e. any authorised translations are, it appears, assumed to be in line with reputation and honor of the author of the first work simply by virtue of being the authorised translation. They may well be -but does the author have any choice in the matter, given the moral right does not exist independently? Not really, it would seem -at least not in the same sense that authors of other creative works have. UK courts have generally exhibited a cautious approach to the right to integrity, it is true, but to take one example, it would seem unreasonable to allow a photographer to object to the way a photograph was cropped and edited for use on a website 52 (such changes perhaps being necessary for the contextual use) but not to even allow an author to object to a translation simply because translation qua translation is seen to involve change and transformation. The paradoxical basis for the reform suggested here is therefore that, arguably, it should be possible for a translation of a literary work to amount to a derogatory treatment; but also that for certain acts of translation, the author should have no control, either via copyright or moral rights, to restrict the act. As it currently stands, it is not possible for a translation to infringe the right of integrity; and the author has control over adaptations.
How to resolve this paradox? As suggested, maintain the notion of authoritative authorised translations, but incorporate such authorised translations into the actions covered by the moral right of integrity. Alongside this allow for the existence of translative replies, acts of translation for which authorisation/permission is not necessarily required (which therefore cannot be considered copyright infringement, but which can wear their connection to the source work with some comfort), and which are also not subject to the moral right of integrity as a result of their purely replicative nature. This could be expressly incorporated into the copyright exceptions e. g. Fair Dealing for the purposes of creating a translative reply. Such unauthorised translations would have to indicate their replicative status, so that if, for example, sold, purchasers would know that the work was not the authorised translation but simply a reply. This gives authors who wish to engage in translation an opportunity to do so without worrying about obtaining permission -the tradeoff being not only that it is not an authorised version (and cannot be sold as such) but also that the author of the reply cannot argue any moral right to integrity over this unauthorised piece.
Such actions would go beyond mere incorporation of such translative action within the current boundaries of fair dealing, where some translative acts might, for example, be considered as being done for the purposes of criticism and review. It would involve an additional exceptional act, and reform of the moral right ambit.
In this respect, copyright in relation to translations would appear to have an excessive degree of power favoring the authorised translation -and especially so given that authors will in most cases simply have contractually consented to signing over translation rights to the publisher, or to the publishers/subsequent copyright owners. These secondary parties -not involved in the act in questionhave an unbalanced degree of power. Perhaps understandably so -if a moral right to object to derogatory treatment existed, and encompassed potential acts of translation, that right would no doubt often conflict with the right to adapt a work (as including translation). But subsuming these potential conflicts into one rightthe right to adapt -leads to scenarios such as that experienced by Underwood, where the power over any creative expression rests solely in the hands of the copyright holder.
Admittedly, where a moral right to object to derogatory treatment existed, Underwood may well have suffered the same treatment. The author herself might even have objected to his subsequent work, had she still been alive. But at least the act of creating a work for sale, and the act of creating translations that concur with the primary authors vision or perspective would be separated conceptually. And under our vision for reform, Underwood could then realise that his only alternative is the translative reply, an action which would recognised as being potentially fair dealing.
Of course, all of this assumes that there is still some degree of authority over subsequent works; whether it be that of the primary author or that of the copyright holder. And maybe the idea that even the author should have some authority over translations is no less troublesome than the publisher or estate having a say over adaptions for sale. Why should an author have a moral right to object to a supposed derogatory treatment involved in translation when the act of translating involves creating a transformative work and may, by necessity, involve a problematic second version? Is this in fact at all different from having a say over who can adapt? Are they not equally problematic?
The reply concept of Underwood neatly sidesteps these issues, however, and points to the true role of an artistic gesture in any event; that of being largely done with any notion of an authoritative judgment (judgment may be involved but it is arguable whether it is authoritative). Even if one disagrees with this notion in matters of law, the very existence of a right to object to a derogatory treatment of a literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work illustrates that it is nonetheless true in matters aesthetic (and in this sense the existence of the copyright exceptions reflect the idea of counterprinciples generally) -that there are ultimately no authorities in matters creative, other than perhaps the original creator, and even that position is problematic.
Translation, copyright and moral rights thus co-exist within a murky praxis of apparent authenticity, questionable notions of authority and accuracy and the notion of artistic freedom/freedom of expression. One writer may cry censorship when subjected to the controls of copyright/moral right, but might make the same cry also if finding that his or her own work has been similarly defaced in translation.
Are there any alternatives to the rigid categories of copyright and/or the right to object to derogatory treatment? As already outlined, the thinking of Underwood offers some assistance. Allowing for translative replies, which underline the communicative nature of translation in the first place, shows that there might be a way of re-thinking translation outside the traditional sphere. Go outside the realm of the permitted, deviate, and a proper translation can be found -being one that does not require permission -indeed cannot even be properly called a translation itself and may be all the better a translation for it.
Here we see perhaps the real impact of the assistance of Unger in formulating these translative replies as a type of deviationist translation, authentic in their own way but not possessed of the authoritative voice that copyright, qua law, believes it and only it confers. Let it believe that, deviationist doctrine suggests; as long as another belief is possible alongside that.
Unger formulated his notion of deviationist doctrine as a consequence of a more general critique of a legal formalism; as he has put it, such deviationist doctrine is a "constructive outcome" of that larger critique. But why a deviationist doctrinal approach? Why, as Unger puts it, should radicals (radical translators, for our purposes, uninterested in the confines of the law) be "interested in preserving doctrine at all?" Transliterated into our specific concerns in this paper this question might be reframed as: why do these translative replies need to be developed within or even alongside legal schema? Why not simply ignore or accept the claims of law to authority on this matter? For Unger, it would be because what is at stake is "the validity of normative and programmatic argument itself." 53 As Unger writes, "at least this must be true when such argument takes the standard form of working from within a tradition rather than the exceptional one of appealing to transcendent insight." When, in other words, radical change is rooted in a generally understood commonality, rather than an individually subjective insight. Reframing this argument for our purposes, one might therefore argue that if we are seeking some kind of connection with an original work at all -if we are accepting of the general appellation of the term translation at all, in other words -then the benefits only of subjective transcendent insight cannot be replied upon to deal with any ethical consequences subsequent to the very notion of translation. Otherwise, any activity could be referred to, subjectively, as translation. Conversely, applying a conservative standard, without any room for growth or adaption, creates a stagnant approach. In between these two extremes lies the opportunity for radical change.
A central feature of the deviationist doctrinal approach is thus this attempt to "cross both an empirical and a normative frontier: the boundaries that separate doctrine from empirical social theory and from argument over the proper organization of society -that is, from ideological conflict." 54 How does deviationist doctrine cross this boundary? In two ways, argues Unger. First, it explores the relations of "cause and effect that lawyers dogmatically assume rather than explicitly investigate when they claim to investigate rules and precedents in the light of imputed purpose." As Unger writes, rule interpretation often makes no real effort to "support or revise the causal assumptions" that underpin any reasonable understanding of a rule. For Unger, "this causal dogmatism of legal analysis" is surprising given the "star role that our ordinary understanding of history assigns to the unintended consequences of action and the paradoxical quality of causal connections." 55 Second: deviationist doctrine opens up "the petrified relations between abstract ideals or categories, like freedom of contract or political equality, and the legal regulated social practices that are supposed to exemplify them." The purpose here is to illustrate that such abstractions can receive "alternative institutional embodiments, each of which gives a different cast to their guiding intentions. Unger also adds, more succinctly, that the crucial feature of deviationist doctrine is the "willingness to recognize and develop the disharmonies of the law: the conflicts between principles and counterprinciples that can be found in any body of law." 57 This is the basis of our suggestion regarding a reframing within -or at least alongside the legal schema -of how translation is treated. Rather more interestingly, Unger further writes that this deviationist doctrine attempts to integrate into doctrinal argument the more fundamental controversy over "the right and feasible structure of society, over what the relations among people should be like in different areas of social activity."
58 Particular "imaginative visions" regarding life in common do exist; Unger cites the examples of North Atlantic countries that appeal to a particular ideal of democracy for the state and citizenship, "to a picture of private community in the domain of family and friendship, and to an amalgam of contract and impersonal technical hierarchy in the everyday realm of work and exchange."
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These visions make the laws built around them appear intelligible and "even justifiable." And yet. As Unger writes, "conflicting tendencies within law constantly suggest alternative schemes of human association;" such conflicts often appear to escalate into "struggles over the basic imaginative structure of social existence."
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The question of what degree of editorial control a copyright holder should have over any potential acts of translation; the question of whether acts of translation need to be authorised; the question of whether a translation can be a derogatory treatment, or whether multiple translations can exist with a formal ethical schema; all of these are questions concerning "schemes of human association" in the context of translation. As it stands today, UK copyright law would point to one imaginative vision only, making the current laws appear intelligible and even justifiable. That is a vision of translation as allowing for primarily singularly authoritative versions. But, as has hopefully been illustrated throughout this paper, this is only one vision for understanding the act of translation. There are conflicting tendencies within the law, suggesting the existence of other visions. The very existence of the moral right to object to a derogatory treatment in general, for example, implies that the author of a work has a right to object; this, in turn, implies that a translation may not be authoritative, that translation is in fact open to debate.
Admittedly, this in itself could also be called into question, under the system of internal development via deviationist doctrine. Arguably it simply also provides to the author of any work, whether original, authorised translation or reply, the same problematic status of being the "Big Other" that we can criticise law for, this taking on of the role of being someone or something to whom an authority must be given on the matter of the text. How to reconcile this broader point with our critique of UK copyright law? Are we simply not replacing one notion of authority with another, more individualistic notion?
In this sense, and to conclude, the role of law in the context of creative endeavors generally must also be considered. Creative endeavors such as translation -or even creative writing in the first instance -are largely individual practices, private worlds of interpretation. They do not concern imaginative visions shared necessarily in common, or even, in a sense, visions that are necessarily completely and properly sharable 61 (although this depends on the perspective of the author/translator/reader.) Why should law therefore have any role in determining the question of control over the creation of such subjective works? It is law that reinforces morality upon all practices -and yet art has an antinomian quality that perhaps transcends morality and becomes therefore properly (and indeed dangerously) ethical. Should not those who wish to translate simply do so, and damn the consequences? When it comes to creative expression utilising what is argued to be a copyright work, should there be any limits on what can be done? If, however, we agree there are ethical matters concerning art -not so much regarding the substance of art, but perhaps more so regarding the movement and use of art ex post creation -and if we agree that artists can have ethical positions concerning how their work is used, arguably some system of arbitration is required. Again, here, reference can be made to the notion of transcendental insight. It may well be that one, singularly and subjectively, has a clear and true position regarding a work that has been created, including how and when it can be used or referred to by others. But singularity and subjectivity are not the only positions of use in society, or even for an individual. Hence our use of Unger's deviationist doctrine in advocating and developing reform. Unger attempts to harmonise the boundary between exceptional transcendental insight and the traditions (including those concerning norms of ownership) necessary to communal life. Arguably, the same can be done in law with regards to 61 A perfect example of this in extremis would be the imaginative vision of Joyce in Finnegans Wake, a(n) (arguably) notoriously subjective work. accommodating creative expression and accommodating communal norms.
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That has been the intent in this article, with regard to the practice of translation.
In any event, and as referred to earlier, it is the duty of the artist to still circumvent the supposed objectivity of the law. This is the antinomian nature of creative expression; without being occasionally or perhaps inherently contrary to reason, can it be said to be creative expression at all? Law may incorporate aspects of this circumvention within it, as has been advocated here; but it will in any event continue to be circumvented, by translators working against oppressive copyright owners and estates -and hopefully by many other types of artists as well.
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